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Abstract: The article is divided into three sections: (i) an overview of the main ethical 
models  in  public  health  (theoretical  foundations);  (ii)  a  summary  of  several  published 
frameworks  for  public  health  ethics  (practical  frameworks);  and  (iii)  a  few  general 
remarks. Rather than maintaining the superiority of one position over the others, the main 
aim of the article is to summarize the basic approaches proposed thus far concerning the 
development of public health ethics by describing and comparing the various ideas in the 
literature. With this in mind, an extensive list of references is provided.  
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1. Clinical Ethics and Public Health Ethics 
 
Clinical  practice  is  characterized  by  a  personal  physician-patient  relationship  [1].  Conversely, 
public health practice is characterized by global attention to whole populations and therefore by an 
emphasis  on  collective  health  conditions,  prevention,  and  social,  economic,  and  demographic 
determinants  of  health  and  disease  [2].  The  collective  perspective  is  described  effectively  by  the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) in its well-known report, “The Future of Public Health,” in which public
health is defined as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be 
healthy” [3].  
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The historical relationship between clinical ethics and public health ethics is the subject of debate: 
differing and sometimes contradicting opinions regarding both the historical development of public 
health ethics and its main cultural models can be found throughout the literature.  
Some authors suggest that public health ethics, in addition to its slower and more recent historical 
development, is actually in conflict with clinical ethics: “in contrast to the traditional emphasis of 
bioethicists  on  the  physician-patient  relationship,  public-health  ethics  focuses  on  the  design  and 
implementation  of  measures  to  monitor  and  improve  the  health  of  populations.  In  addition,  
public-health ethics looks beyond health care to consider the structural conditions that promote or 
inhibit the development of healthy societies” [4]. Most of the authors ascribe this difference to the 
utilitarian  nature  of  public  health.  For  example,  Bayer  and  Fairchild  attribute  the  origins  of  this 
discrepancy  to  the  eminently  utilitarian  approach  of  public  health,  which  is  aimed  at  maximizing 
collective well-being even to the detriment of individual care [5]. 
On the contrary, Wynia and other authors believe that public health ethics is neither slow [6] nor 
opposed [7] to clinical ethics and that new “bridges between medical care and public health” should be 
built [8]. 
There  are  also  middle  positions.  For  example,  Dozon  and  Fassin  have  studied  the  historical 
development of public health with “an anthropological approach”: even though the authors do not 
explore the historical development of public health ethics in great depth, they highlight the cultural 
development of public health and include “morality” in this discussion [9].  
In this sometimes debated area, it is highly significant to note the absence of chapters devoted 
specifically to public health ethics in the majority of books on the history of bioethics and medical 
ethics [10-16]. Similarly, books discussing the theoretical basis of bioethics usually have not discussed 
the foundations of public health ethics until recent years. This characteristic seems to be present in 
books  from  various  cultural  and  linguistic  contexts,  including  English  [17],  French  [18],  and  
Italian [19].  
On the other hand, the historical perspective on the ethics of public health is not disregarded in 
public health texts [20,21]. This situation is meaningful: it indicates that while bioethics has not paid 
much attention to public health ethics for many years, public health professionals themselves perceive 
a real need for it.  
Regardless of potentially different interpretations of its historical development, interest in public 
health ethics is undoubtedly growing on at least three levels: operational [22], deontological [23], and 
theoretical [24]. In other words, if there was actually a delay in the emergence of public ethics with 
respect to clinical ethics during the early years in which bioethics began to become consolidated as an 
autonomous field of study during the seventies and eighties, then during the nineties that gap was 
closed. This evolution has been pointed out by Kass, who published a historical analysis of public 
health ethics in 2004, subdividing it into two main periods: “The early era: 1970s−1990s” and “Stage 
II: the emergency of frameworks, the language of public health ethics” [25]. 
Since the nineties, the increasing importance of ethical issues in the debates about public health 
policies has become evident in different cultural contexts. Examples in francophone countries include 
the Ethics and Public Health (Éthique et santé  publique) Conference that took place in Nantes on 
March  13-14,  1997  [26]  and  the  National  Public  Health  Priorities  (Priorité s  nationales  de  santé  
publique) Conference that took place in Montré al on November 18-19, 1997 [27]. Many aspects of Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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public health ethics have been extensively developed in anglophone countries. Among others, one 
example  is  the  ethics  of  infectious  diseases  [28]:  Dawson  and  Verweij  have  provided  important 
contributions to this field [29].  
2. Cultural and Philosophical Models in Public Health Ethics 
2.1. Different Assessments 
There are evident differences not only regarding the relationship between clinical and public health 
ethics, as pointed out in the previous section, but also regarding the assessment of the primary cultural 
and philosophical models grounding public health ethics. For example, according to Coughlin, some 
“approaches to moral reasoning, such as . . . duty-based theories . . . and communitarianism have not 
been widely applied in public health” [30]. Yet on the contrary, having analyzed public health ethics 
theories, Beauchamp and Steinbock maintain that Kantian moral theory, which is the main duty-based 
theory, “has been dominant in both moral thinking and  public policies” [author‟s italics] and that 
“communitarianism is particularly appropriate for the aggregate approach to policy exemplified by 
public health” [31]. 
2.2. The Utilitarian Roots of Public Health and the Conflicts between Individual and Social Interests 
Several authors have also pointed out that great importance has been afforded to autonomy—and 
therefore to issues such as informed consent, confidentiality, and so forth—in contemporary bioethics, 
to the point that it has become at least a primus inter pares if not a clearly superseding principle. The 
principle of autonomy has tended to dominate healthcare ethics especially in North America [32]. On 
the contrary, however, public health is based predominantly on population-level utility, making it more 
attentive  to  issues  such  as  epidemics,  social  determinants  of  health,  and  cost-effective  decision 
making: a “pervasive utilitarian component” in public health is thereby “undeniable” [33]. 
This utilitarian approach is often connected to the question of an alleged paternalism in public 
health: many philosophers have seen the principal issue of public health as that of paternalism, or the 
intrusion of the State upon individual liberty in order to promote health and safety. Consequently, as 
indicated already in Section 1, most ethical problems in public health are characterized by tension 
between  private  or  individual  interests  and  public  or  social  interests.  The  main  challenge  lies 
embedded in the “relationship between individual and population health” [34]: many authors “have 
highlighted important features that differentiate public health ethics from bioethics, especially public 
health‟s emphasis on population health rather than issues of individual health” [35]. 
The utilitarian approach underlying public health, however, is not necessarily synonymous with a 
lack of attention to individual needs: according to Mackenbach, “the large-scale altruism of public 
health has to be balanced with the value of individual autonomy, and . . . some degree of dreaming of a 
better  and  healthier  world  is  indispensable  for  further  progress  in  public  health  .  .  .  The  ethical 
foundations of public health are not always self-evident, and . . . critical reflection on these foundations 
was, is, and will always be necessary” [36]. Unfortunately, Mackenbach‟s “cherished approach is an 
inherently „idealistic‟ one” [37]. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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In the introduction  to the book  Public  Health  Policy and  Ethics,  Boylan  describes  the tension 
between private and public interests and identifies a distinction between “prudential grounds” and 
“moral grounds” for public health. “The prudential model is based upon a principle of selfish egoism 
and extended egoism (the political expression of selfish egoism),” and the author suggests that “moral 
grounds  for  public  health  are  more  certain  because  they  give  a  clear  and  intersubjective  
foundation” [38]. The question we must address, then, is the following: what lies at the roots of public 
health ethics? 
3. Models for Public Health Ethics 
Classical utilitarianism was formulated in the 19
th century by Jeremy Bentham [40] and John Stuart 
Mill [41]. According to utilitarianism, actions are right insofar as they tend to promote the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number, and wrong as they tend to promote the opposite [42]. Utilitarianism 
is therefore a form of consequentialism: not all consequentialists are utilitarians, but all utilitarians are 
consequentialists.  Utilitarianism  is  a  maximizing  theory:  right  actions  and  policies  are  those  that 
achieve the greatest happiness possible.  
The problem of “sentience” is important in every ethical theory. It is of particular importance in the 
utilitarian  model  since  most  utilitarians  consider  the  ability  to  experience  pain  and  pleasure  an 
important element for assessing utility.  
Many  contemporary  ethicists  and  philosophers  are  in  line  with  utilitarian  theories:  utilitarian 
theories  seem  to  be  an  effective  way  of  maximizing  benefits  for  the  greatest  number  of  people. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  many  situations  in  which  maximizing  happiness  could  conflict  with  other 
values, namely justice, fairness, and honesty. Objections against utilitarianism point to its intrinsic 
injustice, since this theory only considers the amount of good but not the way in which it is distributed. 
Moreover, all benefits cannot be measured according to a single standard, especially where money is 
involved. For example, improvements in health conditions cannot be measured in the same way as 
saving or extending life.  
According to the deontological theories, the good is known by its consistency with moral rules and 
principles. Kant‟s theory is the best known example of deontological theories. Kant emphasizes the 
connection between reason and morality: reason, according to Kant [43], is what separates human 
beings form the rest of the animals and what makes man subject to the moral law; since man is a moral 
agent, he is responsible for his actions. Kantian ethics objects to consequentialism; however, this does 
not mean consequences can or should be ignored [44]. Consequences become relevant only if the 
proposed actions are morally permissible: according to Kant, actions are intrinsically right or wrong 
regardless of their consequences. When we want to know if a proposed action is morally permissible, 
the question we must therefore ask ourselves is not about the likely consequences of doing the act; 
rather, the guiding principle of action should be to “act only on the maxim of an action that you 
consistently will universally” [45].  
Communitarian ethics rejects the notion of timeless, universal, ethical truths based on reason [46]. 
According  to  communitarian  theories,  morality  is  a  cultural  rather  than  abstract  concept. 
Communitarians  maintain  that  our  moral  thinking  has  its  origins  in  the  historical  traditions  of 
particular communities. Communities are not simply collections of individuals: they are groups of 
individuals  who  share  values,  customs,  institutions,  and  interests.  Communitarian  ethics  seeks  to Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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promote  the  “common  good”  in  terms  of  shared  values,  ideals,  and  goals.  In  the  communitarian 
perspective, the health of the public is one of those shared values: reducing disease, saving lives, and 
promoting good health are shared values [47,48]. 
Communitarian ethics has been criticized on both practical and moral grounds. One of the problems 
with communitarian ethics, like utilitarianism, is that the vision of what constitutes a “good life” may 
differ: therefore, there is an inherent risk of a “tyranny of the majority.” Community health programs 
may involve selection of benefit structures that favor some citizens over others. Taken to its extreme, 
the communitarian viewpoint—by making even universal values subject to a community filter—could 
threaten the sense of a common humanity and undermine political and social cooperation.  
Egalitarian theories  typically stress  equal  access  to  certain  goods,  but not  equal  sharing of all 
possible social benefits. John Rawls explains his theory of equal opportunities with the metaphor of 
how a rational agent behind an objective veil of ignorance would choose principles of justice [49]. 
Rawls applied his theories of justice to health care only in later works [50]. Other authors, however, 
and especially Daniels [51], have employed his theories to propose public health models providing 
equal  opportunities.  This  approach emphasizes  the need  for fair procedures  to  be used  in solving 
problems of rationing and conflicts between individual and social interests in public health.  
From  a  practical  perspective,  critics  consider  this  model  insufficient  to  address  the  need  for 
efficiency, willingness to pay, and other problems. From a theoretical perspective, the model does not 
seem to adequately determine goods from which no one can be excluded and values other than equity. 
Other concerns about the equal opportunity model include the exclusive focus on means and resources, 
thereby neglecting ends, and its inattention to individual differences and social peculiarities [52]. 
Liberalism  stresses  equal  access  to  rights  and  free-market  based  approaches.  The  predominant 
values espoused are therefore individual freedom and autonomy. According to liberalists, the role of 
public authorities is to protect individual rights, and the state should maintain a neutral position with 
respect to the various understandings of good [53]. Unlike the libertarians, liberalists claim that human 
well-being  requires  a  certain  amount  of  positive  rights  and  corresponding  duties.  Critiques  of 
liberalism stress that health care is different from economics and is not able support the conditions for 
market allocation [54]. 
 Contractualist theories consider fair and morally right decisions to be based on procedural justice 
and open processes whereby citizens are involved in the deliberations. This approach requires criteria 
for decision making to be clearly settled in advance [55]. Several critiques of this models have been 
expounded. Some authors indicate how theories of just processes ignore deeper and more fundamental 
moral  questions.  Moreover,  contractualists  theories  can  never  be  universal  or  unbounded  by  
culture [56]. 
Personalism considers the individual to be the core value and tries to achieve the common good by 
promoting  and  enhancing  the  good  of  the  individual.  The  main  values  proposed  by  personalism 
include respect for life (public health actions are aimed at protecting and promoting human life and 
health), sociality and solidarity (social solidarity means and involves a commitment to bridge the gap 
between the different sectors of society and to integrate them into a community), and responsibility 
(the  responsibility  to  prevent  and  protect  against  avoidable  diseases,  the  duty  not  to  create 
irresponsible burdens for the society, and responsibility for people in need) [57,58]. Personalism has Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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been criticized since terms “person” and “personalism” have myriad uses: there are atheistic, idealistic, 
Christian and other personalisms [59].  
In casuistry, decision making takes place at the level of the particulars of the case itself. Evaluations 
are not referred to a particular theory; rather, maxims are identified that have a bearing on the case. 
Maxims are simply rules such as “tell the truth” or “be compassionate.” Casuistry requires clearly 
expounding the facts. Decisions are then made on the basis of the most appropriate maxims for the 
specific circumstances [60].  
Other classifications of the models are also possible. For example, Hä yry suggests “three major 
ethicopolitical  approaches  to  all  public  activities.”  He  summarizes  the  various  models  into  three 
categories: welfare liberalism, traditional communitarianism, and radical libertarianism. The author 
identifies a list of words that highlight the main concepts of each approach. For welfare liberalism, 
they include autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, privacy, consent, confidentiality, and 
others. For traditional communitarianism, they include integrity, vulnerability, solidarity, subsidiarity, 
social democracy, honesty, respect, and others. For radical libertarianism, they include liberty, general 
happiness, non-violation of rights, voluntariness, other people‟s interests, non-interference, contract 
and  compensation,  and  others.  According  to  the  author,  however,  “it  seems  that  public  health 
arguments do not deal with all the concerns that people have” [61]. 
Many philosophers have seen the principal issue of public health as that of paternalism, or the 
intrusion of the state upon individual liberty in order to promote health. These ethical models show 
that the dispute is far more extensive than the debate over paternalism [62]. Our aim here is not to 
determine  the  best  moral  theory,  but  to  show  that  all  of  them  have  something  to  contribute  to  
the debate. 
3. Public Health Ethics in Practice: Examples of Ethical Frameworks 
Public health ethics is not only in need of theoretical models, but also of practical frameworks. 
Unlike  the  duties  of  clinicians  to  patients  in  clinical  medicine,  professional  standards  for  ethical 
practice are not well defined in public health. As Taboada and Cuddenback observe, “incorporating 
ethical analysis into public health raises many challenging questions. For example, what does ethical 
analysis add to public health beyond legal or public policy analysis? Is the law itself subject to a 
process of ongoing ethical scrutiny? When ethicists appeal to  „values,‟ who gets to decide which 
values are worthy of protection or how these values should be prioritized in cases of conflict? How 
should ethical analysis address the tension between universal principles and culturally specific values, 
and find common ground among individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds? Such questions have 
practical implications for how public health policies are designed, implemented, and evaluated” [63]. 
In 2001 Kass published “an analytic tool, designed to help health professionals consider the ethics 
implications of proposed interventions, policy proposals, research initiatives and programs” [64]. The 
tool is based on six main questions: (1) “what are the public health goals of the proposed program?”; 
(2) “how effective is the program in achieving its stated goals?”; (3) “what are the known or potential 
burdens of the program?”; (4) “can burdens be minimized . . . [and] are there alternative approaches?”; 
(5) “is the program implemented fairly?”; and (6) “how can the benefits and burdens of the program be 
fairly balanced?”. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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In 2002, Childress and colleagues suggested some “general moral considerations” for an ethical 
framework in public health ethics: producing benefits; avoiding, preventing, and removing harms; 
producing  the  maximal  balance  of  benefits  over  harms  and  other  costs  (often  called  utility); 
distributing benefits and burdens fairly (distributive justice); ensuring public participation, including 
the participation of affected parties (procedural justice); respecting autonomous choices and actions, 
including liberty of action; protecting privacy and confidentiality; keeping promises and commitments; 
disclosing information as well as speaking truthfully (often grouped under transparency); and building 
and maintaining trust [65]. 
In 2006, Nieburg, Bernheim Gaare and Bonnie proposed a “Guide to considering the ethical issues 
in public health practice.” The “guide” is composed of a list of questions subdivided in four main 
areas:  “Assessing  public  health  practice,”  “Identifying  and  recognizing  ethical  issues  and 
considerations,”  “Identifying  options  and  making  and  implementing  public  health  decisions,”  and 
“Later: evaluating the resolution(s)” [66]. 
In 2007, Baum and co-authors observed that “public health practitioners may lack the experience, 
time, resources (including training), or even motivation to deliberately consider ethics in their daily 
wok . . . However, we believe that greater clarification of the ethical underpinnings of their decisions 
can  add  value  to  public  health  works  for  several  reasons.  First,  ethical  clarification  ensures  that 
officials and practitioners unmask normative assumptions and explicitly, rather than implicitly, analyze 
values during their assessments . . . Second, ethical clarification helps balance economic analysis . . . 
Third, clarifying the ethical considerations integrated into a particular policy or program decision can 
help to illuminate decision-makers‟ conceptions of the appropriate scope of public health practice.” On 
this basis, they suggested a framework composed of six steps: (1) “determine population-level utility 
of the proposed action,” (2) “demonstrate evidence of need and effectiveness of actions,” (3) “establish 
fairness  of  goals  and  proposed  implementation  strategies,”  (4)  “demonstrate  accountability,”  
(5) “assess expected efficiencies and costs associated with the proposed action,” and (6) “consider 
political feasibility and community acceptance”
 [67]. 
Two examples that seem particularly exhaustive are  described here in greater detail than those 
mentioned above: the Public Health Code of Ethics, by the Public Health Leadership Society (PHLS) 
and the American Public Health Association (APHA), and the EuroPHEN project.  
In 2002, the PHLS proposed the Public Health Code of Ethics consisting of 12 principles [68]. The 
Code is accompanied by guidelines [69], and has also been adopted by the APHA [70]. Principle 1 
identifies the primary goal of public health, which is to address “the fundamental causes of disease and 
requirements for health, aiming to prevent adverse health outcomes.” This aim is strengthened by 
principle 5, which refers to “policies and programs that protect and promote health”. In principle 2, the 
PHLS emphasizes the need for public health policies and community interests to respect the “rights of 
individuals in the community.” The PHLS recommends that communities be informed about public 
health policies (principle 6), and information is considered  a requirement for effective and timely 
(principle 7) involvement of community members in the development of health policies (principle 3). 
Fairness, justice,  equity are other basic principles in  public health ethics  (principle 4). Moreover, 
public health decisions should be based on scientifically sound information (principle 5), which is also 
the basis for timely intervention (principle 7) and improvement of the physical and social environment 
(principle 9). Other ethical requirements include transparency (principle 12), professional competence Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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(principle 11), and personal data protection (principle 10). The PHLS also gives special attention to 
“diverse values, beliefs, and cultures in the community”: respect for them is a duty (principle 8).  
According to the PHLS and the APHA, the following values and beliefs are crucial assumptions 
inherent to the public health perspective underlying the 12 principles of ethical public health practice:  
  “Humans have a right to the resources necessary for health” 
  “Humans are inherently social and interdependent” 
  “The effectiveness of institutions depends heavily on the public‟s trust” 
  “Collaboration is a key element to public health” 
  “People and their physical environment are interdependent” 
  “Each person in a community should have an opportunity to contribute to public discourse” 
  “Identifying and promoting the fundamental  requirements  for health in  a community are  a 
primary concern to public health” 
  “Knowledge is important and powerful” 
  “Science is the basis for much of our public health knowledge” 
  “People are responsible to act on the basis of what they know” 
  “Action is not based on information alone” 
From 2003 to 2006, the European Public Health Ethics Network (EuroPHEN) carried out a project 
entitled “Public policies, law and bioethics: A framework for producing public health policy across the 
European Union.” EuroPHEN‟s aim was to develop a framework for producing common approaches 
to  public  health  policy  across  Europe.  EuroPHEN  compared  the  organization  of  public  health 
structures and public policy responses to selected public health problems in member states to examine 
how public policy in different countries weighs competing claims of private and public interest [71]. In 
the analysis performed within EuroPHEN, several requirements for a public health ethical framework 
were highlighted. First of all, it is important to be aware that a community is not a homogenous whole 
and to recognize that there are different cultures and disenfranchised members within the community. 
Next, it must be recalled that  
  “Public health institutions should respect the confidentiality of information that can bring harm 
to an individual or community if made public.” 
  “In general consent must be given by the individual before giving any treatment or care, and 
competency is an important element of informed consent.” 
  “Population communication strategies need to be comprehensive to meet the very different 
needs of all members of the population.” 
  “Clinical professional codes tend to stress the need to respect diversity and not discriminate 
regarding patients or colleagues on the basis of a range of items (personal beliefs, religion, nationality, 
race, political affiliation, gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic grouping or patient disability). At the 
level of public health policy, certain of these items which are connected to health may be the basis for 
positive discrimination (age, socio-economic group, patient disability).” 
  “Public  health  ethical  codes  could  contain  a  requirement  to  treat  people  with  respect  and 
consideration for dignity, privacy, etc. at a population level. Respect for dignity and integrity should 
not be seen as implying that a public health professional must do everything that an individual or even 
what the majority of a population may want. Rather their interests should be considered along with the 
interests of other individuals and groups in the population.” Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7                 
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  “Public  health  policy  should  be  implemented  in  a  transparent  manner  that  facilitates 
accountability, including the provision of all information and evidence used to inform the decision 
making process.” 
  “There should be trust in a public health professional to protect and promote the well-being of 
the population as a whole.” Careful policies to avoid conflicts of interest should therefore be adopted.  
  “Public health professionals” are expected “to identify and minimize risks for a population, just 
as clinicians are required to minimize risk to patients and clients.” 
  For  a  public  health  professional,  prioritization  and  resource  allocation  decisions  are 
unavoidable. “Sometimes public health professionals become involved in making decisions, when they 
must  discriminate  between  the  interests  of  individuals,  e.g.,  in  communicable  disease  control. 
However, the important ethical issue is that this discrimination is fair and equitable. Similarly situated 
individuals should have equal access to health care services”. 
These frameworks can be applied in multiple ways. They can be used to assess areas of ethical 
tensions in practice and to provide ways in which to deliberate. The frameworks are conceived to be 
sufficient  flexible for use in  practice and to  balance several  competing considerations  rather than 
setting priorities among principles. Rather than emphasizing a particular ethical principle to guide 
decision-making, they suggest possible processes by which decisions could be reached and evaluated.  
4. Conclusions 
Three main kinds of questions can be raised in every ethical analysis: descriptive, theoretical, and 
normative. Descriptive ethics seeks to answer the question “what is right and good?”. It examines how 
ethics is actually expressed and put into practice. Theoretical ethics seek to answer the question “how 
do  we  justify  our  judgments  about  the  right  and  the  good?”.  It  is  therefore  concerned  with 
justifications. Since theoretical ethics discusses what is good and what makes decisions good, its focus 
is on philosophical—not empirical—questions. Normative ethics focuses mainly on the arguments for 
how we ought to choose the good and act rightly. 
The various schools of ethics (Section 2) tend to emphasize one question over the others, but all 
three questions are involved to some extent in any ethical theory [72]. Some of the ethical models are 
very different and irreconcilable, whereas certain aspects present conflicts that are not so definitive. 
For example, Childress and Bernheim Gaare suggest moving “beyond the liberal and communitarian 
impasse” [73].  
According  to  the  author  of  this  contribution,  personalism  is  the  best  approach  to  face  ethical 
problems  not  only  in  clinical  bioethics,  but  also  in  public  health  ethics  [74].  Personalism,  which 
suggests building up the common good on the basis of attention to and care for the good of each 
person,  is  the  best  way  to  solve  conflicts  between  individual  interests  and  social  interests  [75]. 
However, as stated earlier, the aim of this contribution is not to maintain the superiority of one model 
over the others, but to provide an overview of the models proposed in the literature.  
In this light, Raymond Massé  suggested a model that can be mentioned as a conclusion. The author 
identifies a list of widely shared
 “lighthouse values” [76], including respect for life, beneficence, the 
common  good,  responsibility,  justice,  solidarity,  nonmaleficence,  autonomy,  privacy,  utility,  and 
precaution [77].
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